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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over forty years after the Golden State Killer1 claimed his first 
victim, he was apprehended when Joseph James DeAngelo was 
charged with eight counts of first-degree murder.2 In the days after 
DeAngelo was apprehended, the public learned of the many 
techniques investigators used to apprehend the infamous serial killer.3 
One of the tactics investigators relied on was familial searching.4 First, 
investigators uploaded the DNA profile generated from a crime scene 
DNA sample (suspected to be the Golden State Killer’s DNA) into 
the genealogy website, GEDmatch.5 Using GEDmatch, police 
identified a number of DeAngelo’s close relatives who had submitted 
their DNA to the open source website.6 The list of DeAngelo’s 
relatives narrowed the suspect pool for investigators and eventually, 
they were able to identify DeAngelo as the suspected Golden State 
                                               
 1 The Golden State Killer, also known as the East Area Rapist, was a 
notorious serial killer and rapist. He was suspected of having committed fifty rapes 
and twelve killings in California during the 1970s and 1980s. See Don Thompson & 
Brian Melley, Ex-policeman charged with decades-old serial killings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Apr. 26, 2018, https://apnews.com/2e26c4d39a6f45578794dcc4e2accd2f 
(describing the history and capture of the Golden State Killer). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Ryan Lillis, Dale Kasler, Anita Chabria & Sam Stanton, ‘Open Source’ 
genealogy site provided missing DNA link to East Area Rapist, investigator says, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Apr. 28, 2018, 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article209987599.html. 
 4 Id. 
 5 GEDmatch is a Florida-based, open source, genealogy website. Open-
source software makes the source code for a website or program available for 
everyone to see or use. GEDmatch allows users to upload DNA files obtained from 
commercial genealogy companies such as AncestryDNA or 23andMe. The site 
provides software that allows users to find family members who have also uploaded 
their DNA files. See id. Thomas Goetz, Open Source Everywhere, WIRED, Nov. 1, 2003, 
https://www.wired.com/2003/11/opensource/ (describing open-source 
technology), see also Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy 
Database, THE ATLANTIC, June 1, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-
genealogy-database/561695/ (describing how GEDmatch is used in the process of 
familial searching). 
 6 Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What 
She’s Going to Do Next, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-rae-venter-gsk.html. 
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Killer and charge him with the murders believed to have been 
committed by the infamous serial killer.7 
The Golden State Killer case brought familial searching—used 
to identify family members of a suspect when the suspect himself 
cannot be identified8—to the national forefront.9 Although undeniably 
helpful to the Golden State Killer case, familial searching raises serious 
concerns for any individual who has ever submitted his or her DNA 
to a genealogy website.10 As the amount of individuals submitting their 
DNA to genealogy websites increases, the likelihood of an innocent 
person becoming a suspect of a crime simply because they are distantly 
related to the actual perpetrator, increases as well.11 In fact, in the 
Golden State Killer case, investigators followed two leads before they 
focused their attention on DeAngelo.12 The privacy concerns that were 
raised after familial searching gained national attention are emblematic 
of the questions that should be raised every time a new DNA technique 
is developed and used in the criminal justice system. Whether it is low 
                                               
 7 Id. 
 8 Benjamin Oreskes, et al., False starts in search for Golden State Killer reveal pitfalls 
of DNA testing, LA TIMES, May 4, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-golden-state-killer-dna-20180504-story.html#. 
 9 See id. (noting the controversy and the privacy issues raised by the Golden 
State Killer case and familial searching). 
 10 See Samuel D. Hodge Jr., Current Controversies in the Use of DNA in Forensic 
Investigations, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 39, 52 (2018) (noting the Fourth Amendment 
concerns familial searching raises, the disproportionate impact that familial searching 
could have on minorities, and the lack of regulation regarding familial searching). 
 11 See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity inference of genomic data using long-range familial 
searches, SCIENCE, Oct. 11, 2018, 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2018/10/10/science.aau4832/tab-
pdf (estimating that sixty percent of individuals of European descent have a third 
cousin or closer relative that has submitted their DNA to a genealogy website). 
 12 Based on a rare genetic marker found in the suspect’s profile, investigators 
initially focused on two different men, one from Oregon and one from California, 
both were ruled out as suspects based on their full DNA profile. See Oreskes et al., 
supra note 8. 
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copy number DNA testing,13 “Twin Testing,”14 or—the subject of this 
comment—ethnic inferencing,15 new DNA techniques should be fully 
analyzed not only to confirm their validity, but also to investigate the 
privacy issues implicated by their use. 
Ethnic inferencing is a statistical process used to predict the 
“ethnic appearance” of an unidentified person to whom a DNA 
sample belongs.16 The European Court of Human Rights (“EC”) first 
noted the United Kingdom’s use of this technique in S & Marper v. 
United Kingdom.17 If investigators collect an unknown DNA sample 
from a crime scene, they can use this statistical process to speculate 
what the suspect’s ethnic appearance is.18 In other words, this data is 
                                               
 13 ”Low copy number (LCN) typing . . . refers to the analysis of a sample 
that contains less than 200 [picograms] of DNA.” A picogram is one trillionth of a 
gram. See Bruce Budlowe, Arthur J. Eisenburg & Angela van Daal, Validity of Low 
Copy Number Typing and Applications to Forensic Science, 50 CROAT. MED. J. 207, 207 
(2009)(criticizing the validity of LCN DNA typing). See also United States v. Morgan, 
675 Fed. Appx. 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2017)(summary order) (affirming admission of 
LCN DNA testing, while noting that it is supported by weaker evidence of reliability 
than traditional DNA testing). 
 14 ”Twin Testing” differentiates between identical twins’ DNA by looking 
at epigenetic changes, which are mutations to a person’s DNA that occur during their 
lifetime due to differences in their lifestyle. See Jessica Hamzelou, Police Can Now Tell 
Identical Twins Apart – Just Melt Their DNA, NEWSCIENTIST, Apr. 24, 2015, 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27411-police-can-now-tell-identical-
twins-apart-just-melt-their-dna/. See also Danny McDonald, Man found guilty of 
kidnapping, raping two women in Boston 13 years ago, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2018, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/01/12/man-found-guilty-
kidnapping-raping-two-women-boston-years-
ago/ehUV2SqL5k4XuhSzdKweeN/story.html, (describing a trial judge’s decision to 
exclude evidence of a test purporting to differentiate between DNA samples from 
identical twins.). 
 15 See S and Marper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04, 30566/04, 48 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1169, 1180 (2009) (describing the practice of ethnic inferencing in 
NDNAD, the United Kingdom’s national DNA database). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See e.g. Hannah McKee, Science Behind the Crime, SUNDAY SUN-TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2016, at 30 (describing how investigators used ethnic inferencing to determine 
that the suspect who killed a taxi driver in New Zealand was likely Asian, leading 
police to narrow their suspect pool and eventually apprehend the killer, a Chinese 
man.) See also Eugene Hoshiko, Chinese Man Apologizes For Killing NZ Driver, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 17, 2018, 
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used to narrow down the suspect pool of a particular investigation to 
individuals of only the ethnicity that is generated from the retrieved 
DNA sample.19 The population statistics for ethnic inferencing are 
produced when investigators take a DNA sample from a suspect and 
make their own subjective interpretation of that individual’s ethnicity.20 
When the suspect’s DNA profile is uploaded to the DNA database, 
the subjective interpretation of ethnicity is also linked to the 
individual’s DNA profile.21 Ethnic inferencing threatens individuals’ 
right to privacy; while the subjective interpretations of ethnicity that 
the technique necessitates raise concerns about its validity. 
First, because ethnic inferencing requires investigators to 
assume a person’s race based on predetermined racial classifications, 
ethnic inferencing may be inaccurate, prejudicial, and may perpetuate 
incorrect notions about race.22 Ethnic inferencing’s foundation—
relying on subjective determinations about a person’s race—also 
prompts questions concerning the technique’s validity. Second, ethnic 
inferencing violates the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”). S and Marper v. United Kingdom condemned the United 
Kingdom’s practice of permanently retaining non-convicted 
individuals’ DNA samples.23 S and Marper v. United Kingdom clarifies that 
member states24 do not have unlimited discretion when using their 
                                               
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-chinese-man-apologizes-for-killing-
nz-driver-2011aug01-story.html. 
 19 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE FORENSIC USE OF 
BIOINFORMATION: ETHICAL ISSUES, 80 (2007) http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/The-forensic-use-of-bioinformation-ethical-issues.pdf [hereinafter 
NUFFIELD REPORT]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id. at 80-81 (“[A]pparent ethnicity may not be well predicted[.] . . . 
[T]he classification of people into seven ‘ethnic appearances’ may seem closer to 
racist ideas than a genetic understanding of ethnicity[.] . . . [ethnic inferencing] may 
also reinforce existing prejudices about the likely perpetrators of crime[.]”). 
 23 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1202 (invalidating the United 
Kingdom’s DNA retention framework). 
 24 A member state is “a country that belongs to a political, economic, or 
trade organization such as the European Union”. Cambridge Dictionary, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/member-state (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). In this case, the member states are the countries that make up the 
Council of Europe, all of which must ratify the European Convention on Human 
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DNA databases.25 Just as permanently retaining DNA samples in 
certain scenarios is impermissible, ethnic inferencing is also an 
impermissible use of personal data,26 and thus violates Article 8 of the 
“ECHR”.27 Finally, ethnic inferencing violates Article 14 of the 
ECHR.28 Article 14 prohibits discrimination that is linked to another 
right secured by the Convention.29 In other words, under Article 14 of 
the ECHR, it is not necessary to establish that the any other article of 
the Convention has been violated. A petitioner only has to prove that 
the State’s action comes within the realm of another Article of the 
Convention, and that the petitioner has experienced discrimination 
based on one of the classifications listed within Article 14.30 Ethnic 
inferencing invokes an Article 8 privacy concern and has a 
discriminatory effect against racial minorities; this violates Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.31 In light of the substandard 
validity of ethnic inferencing, as well as Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR 
                                               
Rights. The European Court of Human Right’s decisions are therefore binding on 
all of the members of the Council of Europe. See generally, European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 211 (discussing the purpose and the applicability of the Convention to the 
Council of Europe’s member states in the preamble) [hereinafter Convention]. 
 25 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1202 (invalidating permanent 
retention of non-convicted individuals’ DNA samples). 
 26 See id. at 1191 (“The court observes, nonetheless, that the [DNA] profiles 
contain substantial amounts of unique personal data.”). 
 27 See Convention, supra note 24, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. [ . . . ] There shall 
be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society . . . “). 
 28 Id. at art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or status.”). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Article 14 | Anti-discrimination, UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG, 
https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/incorporated-rights/articles-index/article-14/. See 
eg., Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 
9473/81, 9474/81, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 498-503 (1985) (finding that although 
Article 8 on its own had not been violated, Article 14—when taken in conjunction 
with Article 8—had been violated). 
 31 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 8, 14. 
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violations, the United Kingdom should discontinue its use of ethnic 
inferencing as an investigatory tool. 
II. HISTORY OF DNA ANALYSIS 
Ethnic inferencing is just one of many techniques developed 
through DNA technology. As a part of DNA technology ethnic 
inferencing is best understood within that context. The technique’s 
context within DNA analysis provides insight into why ethnic 
inferencing is more problematic compared to other types of DNA 
analysis. 
A. General Overview of DNA Analysis 
DNA analysis and profiling—the process by which a “DNA 
fingerprint” is developed from a sample to be compared to other 
samples or known individuals32—are among the most powerful tools 
a prosecutor may use. After its introduction into the courts, DNA 
evidence quickly became the “Gold Standard” of forensic evidence.33 
The supremacy of DNA evidence derives from its discriminating 
power: that is, its ability to differentiate between individuals.34 With a 
properly preserved sample, the random match probability—the 
probability that a random individual from the population would have 
the same DNA profile and, therefore, match the sample—could reach 
the order of hundreds of billions.35 Even though DNA profiling relies 
on complex biochemistry and biology, the basic principles are relatively 
simple to understand. 
                                               
 32 Karen Norrgard, Forensics, DNA Fingerprinting, and CODIS, 1 NATURE 
EDUC. 35, 35 (2008). 
 33 Channon Hodge, The Shifting Science of DNA in the Courtroom, CNN, June 
9, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/09/health/dna-technology-forensic-
evidence/index.html. 
 34 See James Randerson, What DNA Can Tell US, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 26, 
2008, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/apr/27/genetics.cancer (“there 
are repeated sections of DNA that vary considerably between individuals). 
 35 S. Panneerchelvam & M.N. Norazmi, Forensic DNA Profiling and Database, 
10 MALAYSIAN J. OF MED. SCI. 20, 22 (2003). 
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A DNA profile relies on Short Tandem Repeats (“STRs”) in 
order to differentiate between individuals.36 A DNA strand is made up 
of four different base pairs—Adenine (“A”), Thymine (“T”), Guanine 
(“G”), and Cytosine (“C”)—that repeat in different combinations to 
form genes.37 STRs are areas of a DNA strand where the same base 
pairs repeat in the same order for a certain length along the DNA 
strand.38 STRs do not code for any known genes and the length of the 
STR (how many times the base pair repeats) is different between 
individuals, more so than other areas of the DNA strand.39 These two 
qualities are useful for two reasons. First, the areas tested do not reveal 
any potentially prejudicial characteristics of the suspect.40 Second, 
these qualities allow for differentiation between individuals.41 Figure 
One depicts an example of what a typical DNA profile using STRs 
looks like. 
Repeat Mouth [Sample] 
TPOX 7, 11 
D3S1358 15, 19 
D5S818 10, 14 
FGA 18, 23 
CSF1PO 12, 13 
D7S820 9, 9  
                                               
 36 Id. at 21. 
 37 Id. at 20. 
 38 See id. at 21 (“[T]he STR loci are differentiated by the number of copies 
of the repeat sequence within each of the STR locus.”). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 20. 
 41 Id. at 21 (“[T]he likelihood that a single individual has an identical STR 
profile . . . with another individual taken at random in the population [is] extremely 
rare.”). 
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D8S1179 12, 12 
TH01 9, 9  
vWA 16, 16  
D13S317 10, 13 
D16S539 10, 10  
D18S51 12, 13 
D21S11 28, 30  
AMEL Male 
          Figure One: Example of a standard STR profile.42 
The letters and numbers in the first column are the names of 
the different loci—areas of DNA43—where STRs occur.44 The second 
column represents the length of the different STRs.45 The two 
numbers listed represent each individual’s two alleles—different 
versions of the same DNA sequence46—for each STR. One allele is 
inherited from each parent. 47 Once an examiner has a completed 
profile, he or she can determine the probability that a random 
individual from the population has the same DNA profile.48 Each allele 
                                               
 42 Recreated from, Jonathan Jerry, The Interrogation of Mr. DNA, Part 3 of 3: 
Detection, CRACKED SCIENCE, Sept. 26, 2013, 
https://crackedscience.com/2013/09/26/the-interrogation-of-mr-dna-part-3-of-3-
detection/. 
 43 NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NCI DICTIONARY OF TERMS, accessed 
Nov. 18, 2018 (“[A locus is t]he physical site or location of a specific gene on a 
chromosome.”) [hereinafter NCI DICTIONARY]. 
 44 Jerry, supra note 42. 
 45 Id. 
 46 NCI DICTIONARY, supra note 43 (“[An allele is o]ne of two or more DNA 
sequences occurring at a particular gene locus.”). 
 47 Panneerchelvam & Norazmi, supra note 35, at 22. 
 48 Id. at 22. 
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at the different loci, that is, each different version of a gene at the 
different locations along the DNA strand, is relatively common, 
usually occurring in one to ten percent of the population.49 The 
differentiating power of DNA profiles come from the multiplication 
of all the probabilities of each STR across multiple loci.50 
Different DNA databases test anywhere from ten to fifteen 
different loci.51 Depending on how many loci the database uses in 
conjunction with other factors, such as the quality of the sample, a 
DNA profile can generate a ‘match’ to the suspect.52 The random 
match probability for the sample is developed from multiplying the 
probabilities of each STR across all of the loci.53 This means that the 
random match probability for the entire profile could be as high as one 
in one hundred billion.54 Because DNA evidence is so powerful in its 
ability to differentiate between individuals, it is often used as evidence 
in court to prove the guilt or innocence of a suspect.55 With match 
probabilities as high as one in one hundred billion, judges and juries 
are likely to give DNA evidence substantial weight56; therefore, DNA 
evidence must be analyzed carefully anytime it is used. 
                                               
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See John Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used 
in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 253, 253 (2006). See also Butler, Short 
Tandem Repeat Typing Technologies Used in Human Identity Testing, 43 BIOTECHNIQUES 
(SUPPLEMENT TO VOL. 43) ii, ii (2007). 
 52 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DNA EVIDENCE BASICS: 
POSSIBLE RESULTS FROM TESTING, Aug. 9, 2012 (“The term ‘match’ is commonly 
used when the test results are consistent with the results from a known individual.”). 
 53 Panneerchelvam & Norazmi, supra note 35, at 23. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Naomi Elster, How Forensic DNA Evidence Can Lead to Wrongful 
Convictions, JSTOR DAILY, Dec. 6, 2017, https://daily.jstor.org/forensic-dna-
evidence-can-lead-wrongful-convictions/ (noting the prominence that DNA 
evidence has in criminal investigations.). 
 56 See id. (“[M]ost people have unrealistic perceptions of the meaning of 
scientific evidence, especially when it comes to DNA, which can lead to miscarriages 
of justice.”). 
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B. DNA Analysis in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has influenced the development and 
evolution of DNA analysis since the technology’s inception.57 Modern 
DNA evidence was first used in a criminal case in 1987, in the United 
Kingdom.58 The year before, a young girl, Dawn Ashworth, 
disappeared while walking home in Narborough, Leicestershire.59 
Within a few short days, police located Dawn’s body, determined she 
had been raped and murdered, and had their first suspect, Richard 
Buckland, in custody.60 Buckland confessed to killing Dawn, but 
denied involvement in another murder that police suspected was 
connected to Dawn’s murder.61 Because the police doubted Buckland’s 
guilt and suspected that a serial killer was involved, police approached 
geneticist Alec Jeffreys to perform the first modern DNA test62 used 
in a criminal case.63 The test confirmed what investigators feared: the 
DNA found at the crime scene did not match Buckland’s.64 
                                               
 57 Alec Jeffrey discovered the forensic applications of DNA profiling while 
researching at the University of Leicester. The first national DNA database was 
established in the United Kingdom and the first successful familial search took place 
in the United Kingdom. Lutz Roewer, DNA Fingerprinting in Forensics, Past, Present, 
Future, 4 INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 1, 1, 4 (2013). 
 58 Ian Cobain, Killer Breakthrough – the Day DNA Evidence First Nailed a 
Murderer, THE GUARDIAN, June 7, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/jun/07/killer-dna-evidence-genetic-profiling-criminal-investigation. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 A modern DNA test uses the process described infra section II(A). See 
Roewer, supra note 57, at 1 (describing Alec Jeffrey’s discovery). In the past, forensic 
scientists used blood typing or similar analyses to aid in criminal investigations. Blood 
typing is only able to differentiate between people based on their blood type. See 
Corey Harbison, AO Blood Type Identification and Forensic Science (1900-1960), THE 
EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jun. 2, 2016), 
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/abo-blood-type-identification-and-forensic-science-
1900-1960. 
 63 See Cobain, supra note 58 (noting Jeffreys had already been using his test 
in British courts to assist in cases where children were being denied British 
citizenship to prove that they were children of British citizens). 
 64 Id. 
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With a potential serial killer at large, the police took 
extraordinary measures. Over the next month, the police tested the 
DNA of almost 1,000 men in the Narborough neighborhood without 
finding a match.65 By the time eight months has passed, police had 
tested 5,500 men.66 Nevertheless, the police still had not found a 
match. The police expanded their search and, eventually focused on 
Colin Pitchfork, whose DNA was a match.67 The police found Dawn’s 
killer.68 This case, the very first of its kind, foreshadowed the power 
and risks of DNA technology. While Pitchfork’s apprehension 
demonstrates DNA evidence’s power to exonerate the innocent and 
convict the guilty with almost complete certainty, this case also reveals 
how police can use the power of DNA profiling to coerce an entire 
village to submit DNA samples. 
Since Pitchfork’s case in 1987, the United Kingdom has 
continued to play an influential role in the development of DNA 
technology. In 1995 the United Kingdom launched the first national 
forensic DNA database in the world.69 The National DNA Database 
(“NDNAD”) was the first of many DNA databases, many of which 
have continuously expanded in size over the years.70 The usefulness of 
DNA databases relies on the assumption that individuals who have 
been convicted of a crime in the past, or individuals with a criminal 
history, are more likely to commit crimes in the future.71 Some DNA 
                                               
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. (Colin Pitchfork “ . . . pl[ed] guilty to two counts of murder, two of 
rape, two of indecent assault and one count of conspiring to pervert the course of 
justice. . . . [Pitchfork] was sentenced to life imprisonment, . . . “). 
 69 See David Skinner, ‘The NDNAD Has No Ability in Itself to be Discriminatory’: 
Ethnicity and the Governance of the UK National DNA Database, 47 SOCIOLOGY 976, 978 
(2013). See also NATIONAL DNA DATABASE STRATEGY BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 
2016/17, (2018). 
 70 See Hellen Wallace, The UK National DNA Database: Balancing Crime 
Detection, Human Rights and Privacy, 7 SCI. AND SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) S26, S26 (2006) 
(describing the United Kingdom’s “DNA Expansion Programme,” which could 
expand the NDNAD to include twenty-five percent of the adult male population in 
the United Kingdom). See also John Butler, ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA 
TYPING: METHODOLOGY 214 (Elsevier Academic Press 3d ed. 2012) (describing the 
expansion of CODIS, the United States’ DNA database). 
 71 Cobain, supra note 58. 
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databases are limited to convicted individuals and active suspects, these 
DNA databases have a limit to the number of profiles that can be 
included.72 However, other databases do not have these limitations so 
they do not have the same limits to the number of profiles that may be 
included. Initially, the NDNAD only contained samples from those 
convicted of violent offenses, sexual offenses or burglaries.73 However, 
since the NDNAD’s inception, the United Kingdom has undertaken 
the DNA Expansion Programme,74 which was intended to increase the 
size of the database and include “virtually the entire active criminal 
population,” including non-convicted individuals.75 
The theory behind the expansion of the databases is that the 
more samples the databases include, the higher the likelihood is that 
an unknown suspect’s DNA will be in the system.76 Through a series 
of legislative enactments,77 the NDNAD was expanded to include any 
individual charged with a recordable offense,78 anyone acquitted of a 
recordable offense, and anyone suspected of having committed a 
recordable offense.79 Today, due to this expansion, the United 
Kingdom possesses the largest DNA database in the world, with just 
                                               
 72 See Butler, supra note 70, at 219 (comparing all national DNA databases; 
of the fifty-four countries that have national DNA databases, forty-four retain 
profiles from convicted offenders, and forty-eight retain samples from suspects and 
arrestees). 
 73 Wallace, supra note 70, at S26. 
 74 HOME OFFICE, PRIME MINISTER HAILS HI-TECH DRIVE AGAINST 
CRIME (2000). 
 75 Wallace, supra note 70 (quoting HOME OFFICE, PRIME MINISTER HAILS 
HI-TECH DRIVE AGAINST CRIME (2000)). 
 76 See BUTLER, supra note 70, at 213 (“These databases are effective because 
a majority of crimes are committed by repeat offenders.”). 
 77 As part of the DNA Expansion Programme, a series of laws were enacted 
that gradually expanded which profiles could be uploaded to the NDNAD. HOME 
OFFICE, DNA EXPANSION PROGRAMME 2000-2005: REPORTING ACHIEVEMENT 
FORENSIC SCIENCE AND PATHOLOGY UNIT 3 (2005). 
 78 ”Recordable offenses” refers to offenses that are entered in the Police 
National Computer, a police database in the United Kingdom. All offenses where a 
term of imprisonment may be set, as well as a number of other offenses specified by 
regulations, are recordable. Sunita Mason, A Common Sense Approach – A review of the 
Criminal Records Regime in England and Wales – Report on Phase 2, HOME OFFICE, Nov. 
30, 2011. 
 79 Wallace, supra note 70, at S26-S27. 
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over eight percent of its citizens in the database.80 The DNA 
Expansion Programme continued to increase the size of the NDNAD, 
reaching its peak with the policy challenged and ultimately struck down 
by S and Marper v. United Kingdom. The policy permitted the permanent 
retention of all DNA samples in the database, including samples from 
individuals who had never been convicted of a crime.81 
C. S and Marper v. United Kingdom and its Aftermath 
The two applicants82 in S and Marper were two individuals 
whose DNA had been permanently retained in NDNAD, even though 
they had never been convicted of a crime.83 The first applicant, S—
whose real name was not used because he was a minor at the time he 
was apprehended—was arrested and charged with attempted 
robbery.84 Even though S was acquitted of the charge, his DNA was 
permanently retained in the NDNAD.85 The second applicant, Marper, 
was charged with harassing his partner; however, because the two later 
reconciled, the charges were dropped.86 Nevertheless, like S, Marper’s 
DNA profile was also permanently retained in the NDNAD.87 Both 
applicants requested that their profiles be removed from the database, 
and both requests were denied.88 The applicants appealed to the 
European Court of Human rights to hear their case. The European 
Court of Human Rights89 (“EC”) accepted the case to determine 
                                               
 80 Aaron Opoku Amanankwaa & Carole McCartney, The UK DNA Database: 
Implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act of 2012, 284 FORENSIC SCI INT’L 117, 118 
(2018) (noting that there are 6,112,274 known samples and 575,923 crime scene 
samples in NDNAD). 
 81 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1169. 
 82 The European Convention on Human Rights allows citizens of the 
member states to apply for relief if one of their rights set out in the Convention has 
been violated, after exhausting all domestic remedies. Convention, supra note 24, at 
art 34, 35. 
 83 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep at 1169. 
 84 Id. at 1172. 
 85 Id. at 1173. 
 86 Id. at 1172-73. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1173. 
 89 The EC is a court established by the European Convention of Human 
Rights. The EC hears cases from individual parties who allege that a member state 
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whether the permanent retention of DNA samples of acquitted 
persons violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”).90 
Article 8 of the ECHR protects individuals’ right to privacy.91 
In S and Marper, the applicants maintained that the retention of their 
DNA samples, DNA profiles, and fingerprints was an ongoing 
interference with their right to privacy that was not supported by a 
sufficient state interest.92 The EC found that the use of DNA databases 
to combat crime and apprehend criminals is indeed a legitimate state 
interest.93 However, the EC went on to conclude: 
[T]he Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate 
nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, 
cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons 
suspected but not convicted of offences, as applied in 
the case of the present applicants, fails to strike a fair 
balance between the competing public and private 
interests and that the respondent State has overstepped 
any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. 
Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a 
disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right 
to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society.94 
                                               
has violated a right secured by the Convention. Convention, supra note 24 at art. 34, 
35. 
 90 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; see also Convention, supra 
note 24, at art. 8. 
 91 See Convention, supra note 24, at art. 8 (“(1) Everyone has a right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
 92 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187-88. 
 93 See id. at 1195-97 (noting that as of September 30, 2015, the NDNAD had 
181,000 profiles from non-convicted individuals. Of these, 8,251 were later matched 
with a crime scene sample.). 
 94 Id. at 1202. 
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In other words, the EC found that even though the retention 
of DNA samples did facilitate legitimate police work, the retention of 
innocent individuals’ DNA samples was not proportionate to the 
interreference with their right to privacy. In line with this decision, the 
EC ruled that the permanent retention of DNA samples from 
acquitted suspects violates Article 8 of the ECHR.95 
Since S and Marper, the United Kingdom has only taken 
minimal steps to correct its DNA retention policy. The current DNA 
retention regime generally allows preserving innocent individuals’ 
DNA samples for a maximum of three years after concluding an 
investigation.96 Although the current DNA retention regime minimizes 
the longer-lasting effects of permanent retention, innocent individuals’ 
DNA profiles are still in the NDNAD for at least three years.97 
Additionally, investigators may petition to have a DNA profile retained 
for longer than three years.98Although the United Kingdom has taken 
steps away from the permanent retention of non-convicted individuals’ 
DNA profiles, the United Kingdom still allows convicted individuals’ 
DNA profiles to be permanently kept in the NDNAD. In 2020, the 
ECtHR held that permanently retaining DNA samples of persons 
convicted of a recordable offense without the possibility of review and 
without regard to the seriousness of the offense does violate Article 8 
of the ECHR.99 However, again the court failed provide specific 
guidance on what DNA retention policies would be allowable. Thus, 
S and Marper and subsequent cases have failed to answer which DNA 
retention policies are permissible and which are not. 
In essence, the EC only invalidated the specific practice 
challenged in S and Marper: the permanent retention of non-convicted 
individuals’ DNA profiles. The EC did not set any particular guidelines 
for what DNA retention and DNA database policies violate Article 8 
                                               
 95 Id. 
 96 Amanakwaa & McCartney, supra note 80, at 119 (comparing the United 
Kingdom’s different DNA retention regimes). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Gaughran v. United Kingdom, App. No. 45245/15 (2020) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-200817 (finding a violation of Art. 8 of the 
ECHR). 
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of the ECHR.100 In theory, the United Kingdom could have changed 
its DNA retention policy to permit retaining DNA profiles of 
acquitted persons for more than twenty-five years after their acquittal, 
which the EC noted was the practice in France.101 
The EC also discussed several practices used in various DNA 
databases,102 but likewise provided no guidance as to whether those 
practices violate individuals’ right to privacy.103 The EC noted that the 
information in NDNAD is accessible by over fifty non-police bodies, 
such as researches and private companies.104 One of these non-police 
bodies, the Schengen Information System, is used by over thirty 
countries for national security purposes.105 Most importantly, the EC 
flagged, but did not analyze, the ethnic inferencing technique used by 
investigators in conjunction with the NDNAD.106 
D. Ethnic Inferencing 
Ethnic inferencing uses the DNA profiling process107 in order 
to make a prediction about the ethnic appearance of an individual.108 
It is similar to the process used in familial searching,109 except that it is 
much broader in scope; connecting individuals based on ethnicity 
rather than on familial relationships. This specific DNA profiling 
process is based on the research by the now defunct Forensic Science 
                                               
 100 See generally S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1206 (invalidating the 
challenged retention policy but failing to give further guidance). 
 101 See id. at 1184 (surveying different EU member states’ DNA retention 
policies noting that, “[i]n France[,] DNA profiles can be retained for [twenty-five] 
years after acquittal or discharge[.]”). See also Gaughran v. Northern Ireland [2015] 
(UKSC) 29 [Annex B] (comparing DNA retention policies, the longest retention 
policy being Lithuania’s, which allows for inclusion in the DNA database for one 
hundred years or ten years after the acquitted person dies). 
 102 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H. R. Rep at 1179-80, 1193. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 European Commission, Questions and Answers Schengen Information 
System (SIS II), Apr. 9, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
309_en.htm. 
 106 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1180. 
 107 See infra, section II(A). 
 108 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 80. 
 109 See infra, section I. 
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Service.110 The science behind ethnic inferencing is rather intuitive. The 
different alleles of STRs occur in different frequencies across different 
ethnic groups.111 Thus, when random match probabilities are 
calculated, they are calculated for the population at large, as well as for 
several subpopulations.112 Figure 2 exemplifies how this would be 
reported.  
Estimated Population Proportions for the Genotype of the 
Profile from Semen Recovered in the Study  
Caucasian  1 in 3 billion  
Afro-Caribbean 1 in 83 billion  
Indian sub-continent  1 in 4 billion  
Southeast Asian  1 in 35 billion  
Middle Eastern  1 in 9 billion  
Figure 2: Report of random match probabilities for different 
sub-populations.113 
From the random match probability calculation for different 
subpopulations, analysts can determine the likelihood ratio114 for the 
sample coming from an individual from one population over 
                                               
 110 The Forensic Science Service (“FSS”) was the former government-
sponsored forensic science laboratory that provided forensic services to England and 
Wales. The FSS closed in 2012 due to funding issues. Forensic testing in the United 
Kingdom is now performed by private agencies or by the police agencies themselves. 
Paul Rincon, ‘Higher Cost’ of Forensic Science Service Closure, BBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2013, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-21251162. 
 111 Alex Lowe et al., Inferring Ethnic Origin by Means of an STR profile, 119 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 17, 17 (2001). 
 112 Id. at 21. 
 113 Recreated from Id. 
 114 See COMMITTEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, THE EVALUATION OF 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (National Research Council 1996) (“The [likelihood 
ratio] is the ratio of the probability of a match if the DNA in the evidence sample 
and that from the suspect came from the same person to the probability of a match 
if they came from different persons.”). 
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another.115 To illustrate, in the example from Figure two, the likelihood 
ratio for Afro-Caribbean ethnicity to Caucasian ethnicity is twenty-
eight, which means that the sample is twenty-eight times more likely to 
come from an Afro-Caribbean individual than from a Caucasian 
individual.116 Thus, using ethnic inferencing, investigators may limit 
their search to Afro-Caribbean people. This study laid the foundation 
for ethnic inferencing to be used in the United Kingdom. 
The research to develop ethnic inferencing relied on a sample 
of data from the NDNAD in 1996.117 Since then, the NDNAD has 
significantly expanded in size.118 In order for the ethnic inferencing 
technique to function on an ongoing basis, two steps must be taken. 
First, when police retrieve a sample from a suspect, the officer must 
make a subjective determination of the suspect’s appearance based on 
seven pre-selected categories:119 Asian; Black; Chinese, Japanese or 
Southeast Asian; Middle Easter, White Northern European; White 
Southern European; and unknown.120 The same categories are used 
when investigators request that an ethnic inference be made for an 
unknown sample.121 After an ethnic inference is made, the investigator 
can then focus his or her efforts on suspects of that ethnicity.122 
NDNAD also allows private companies and academic researchers to 
use ethnic inferencing data to conduct research.123 Although ethnic 
                                               
 115 Lowe et. al, supra note 111, at 21. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 17. 
 118 See Wallace, supra note 70 (noting that the NDNAD could expand to 
include twenty-five percent of the United Kingdom’s adult male population and 
seven percent of the adult female population). See also NATIONAL DNA DATABASE 
STRATEGY BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2013-14 6 (2014) (demonstrating the growth 
of the NDNAD through several tables). 
 119 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 80. 
 120 See NATIONAL DNA DATABASE STRATEGY BOARD, NDNAD 
STATISTICS, AS OF 30TH SEPTEMBER 2018 (2018) (hereinafter NDNAD STATISTICS) 
(“The ethnic appearance data is based on the judgment of the police officers taking 
that samples as to which of seven broad ethnic appearance categories they consider 
the individuals to belong.”). 
 121 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 80. 
 122 Lowe et. al, supra note 111, at 20. 
 123 NUFFIELD REPORT supra note 19, at 81. 
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inferencing may help investigators narrow down their suspect pool, the 
process raises many concerns. 
In addition to the privacy concerns that are implicated by any 
use of DNA technology, such as familial searching, ethnic inferencing 
is problematic for a number of additional reasons. First, the technique 
relies on many assumptions about race that are not necessarily true, 
thus raising questions about the technique’s validity.124 The 
classifications used do not correlate to those used in population 
genetics research, nor do they necessarily correlate with a person’s self-
identified ethnicity.125 Ethnicity is not a binary question; a person can 
have multiple ethnicities and, therefore, many people simply do not fit 
into one of the pre-selected categories.126 Additionally, ethnicity may 
not be discernible in every case.127 
Second, the ethnic inferencing may lead to prejudicial ideas 
about minorities. Through the use of DNA dragnets,128 minorities may 
become overrepresented in DNA databases.129 Overrepresentation 
may lead to the assumption that certain minorities are more likely to 
commit crimes than others. Third, the use of ethnic inferencing can 
cause investigators to develop “tunnel vision.”130 By focusing in on 
individuals of one ethnicity, investigators can miss clues that would 
otherwise lead to the actual perpetrator.131 
                                               
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 80-81. 
 126 Id. at 81. 
 127 See id. at 81 (“Ethnicity is often only loosely linked to actual 
appearance.”). 
 128 A DNA dragnet is a technique used by investigators to collect DNA from 
a large number of people at once. For example, the police used a DNA dragnet in 
the Colin Pitchfork case, infra section II(B), to collect DNA samples from the entire 
village. See Mildred Cho & Pamela Sankar, Forensic Genetics and Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications Beyond the Clinic, 36 NATURE GENETICS (Supplement) 1, 6 (2004) 
(describing DNA dragnets). 
 129 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1180. 
 130 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 131 See Carole McCartney, The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal 
Investigation, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 175, 185 (2006) (“There tends to be a reliance 
on forensic evidence in terms of once you have it other avenues aren’t followed up.”). 
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Finally, ethnic inferencing violates Article 8 and Article 14 of 
the ECHR.132 The retention of ethnic data with a suspect’s DNA 
profile is an impermissible invasion of individuals’ private affairs.133 
The right to privacy134 encompasses a person’s DNA profile.135 Ethnic 
inferencing increases the privacy invasion by including personal 
information about an individual’s ethnicity with their DNA profile. 
Like the permanent retention policy struck down by S and Marper, 
ethnic inferencing is also an unjustifiable interference with individuals’ 
right to privacy. 
Further, Article 14 of the ECHR states that “[t]he enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or status.”136 The 
EC has interpreted this to mean that Article 14 does not require 
another Article violation.137 Instead the challenged practice must come 
within the realm of another Article of the convention.138 Therefore, in 
the case of ethnic inferencing, even if the technique does not explicitly 
violate Article 8 of the ECHR, if it comes within the realm of the right 
to private life, it invokes Article 14 of the ECHR.139 For the reasons 
discussed above, ethnic inferencing discriminates against minorities, 
and thus also violates Article 14.140 
Ethnic inferencing, as an investigatory technique, lacks validity, 
discriminates against minorities, and violates Article 8 and Article 14 
                                               
 132 See Convention, supra note 24, at art. 8, 14. 
 133 Id. at art. 8. 
 134 See infra section II(C). 
 135 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189 (“The mere storing of data 
relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the 
meaning of art.8.”). 
 136 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 14. 
 137 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep.at 499. 
 138 See id. (“Article 14 . . . complements the other substantive portions of the 
Convention and Protocols . . . [T]he application of Article 14 . . . does not necessarily 
presuppose a breach of those provisions[.] . . . The facts at issue [must] fall within 
the ambit of one of more of the [other provisions.]”). 
 139 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 14. 
 140 Id. 
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of the ECHR. Ethnic inferencing already may not be used for 
evidentiary purposes in criminal prosecutions;141 in light of all of the 
issues discussed, the United Kingdom should take the additional step 
to exclude the use of the technique for investigatory purposes as well. 
III. ETHNIC INFERENCING’S FOUNDATION, PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
AND INVASION INTO INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVATE LIFE RAISE SERIOUS 
CONCERNS 
Although ethnic inferencing can be a useful investigative tool, 
the questions concerning its validity, the effect it has on minorities, and 
its context within the European Convention on Human Rights should 
be carefully analyzed. A full analysis of these questions reveals that the 
minimal investigative value that ethnic inferencing provides is 
outweighed by its invasion into individuals’ privacy and its prejudicial 
effect on minorities. 
A. Ethnic Inferencing Relies on Studies and Ideas about Race that 
Have Not Been Properly Validated 
Although the United Kingdom has a relaxed approach to 
admitting scientific evidence in courts,142 scientific evidence—that is, 
evidence that is outside of a lay individual’s knowledge—must still 
have sufficient proof of reliability.143 Although ethnic inferencing is 
already excluded from use in criminal prosecutions,144 questions about 
its validity and reliability remain. A method is valid only if it relies on 
sound scientific principles.145 On the other hand a method is reliable 
                                               
 141 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81 (citing NATIONAL DNA 
DATABASE, THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT, 2004-2005, 35 
(2006)). 
 142 See Éadaoin O’Brien et al., Science in the Court: Pitfalls, Challenges, and 
Solutions, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1, 2 (2015) (describing the 
English and Welsh approach to expert evidence as laissez-faire). 
 143 Id. at 3 (describing the challenges to crafting a rule concerning reliability). 
 144 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81 (citing NATIONAL DNA 
DATABASE, THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT, 2004-2005, 35 
(2006)). 
 145 See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 
595, 597 (1988) (explaining the difference between validity and reliability). 
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only if it reaches a specified degree of accuracy, meaning the method 
returns the “correct” result a specified amount of times.146 Both the 
validity and reliability of ethnic inferencing are questionable. First, the 
ethnic categories used by the NDNAD do not correspond with the 
classifications used in population genetics.147 Second, an individual may 
be a member of different ethnicities and may not actually identify with 
the ethnicity assigned by the investigator.148 Finally, investigators may 
misidentify an individual’s ethnicity or may not be able to discern one 
in every case.149 These questions about the principles underlying ethnic 
inferencing suggest that ethnic inferencing is not valid nor reliable and, 
as such, should not be used by investigators. 
1. Ethnic Inferencing is Not Supported by Proper Validity 
within the Population Genetics Field 
Population genetics is a subset of biology and genetics 
research.150 Specifically, population geneticists study populations of 
organisms, including humans, in order to see how different genes are 
distributed throughout a population.151 Ethnic inferencing relies on 
theories of population genetics, specifically, that the STRs used in 
DNA profiling occur with different frequencies across populations. 152 
However, despite relying on principles of population genetics, ethnic 
inferencing uses different ethnic categories than population geneticists 
use.153 In the United Kingdom, the NDNAD uses the following 
categories: White Northern European; Black; Asian; White South 
European; Middle Eastern; and Chinese, Japanese, or Southeast 
Asian.154 However, population geneticists disagree whether races can 
be broken down into categories and, if so, what the categories are. For 
example, in 2002 a study conducted by Noah Rosenburg (and other 
researchers) identified five subcategories of the human population: 
                                               
 146 Id. 
 147 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 148 Id. at 80-81. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Brian Charlesworth, What Use is Population Genetics?, 200 GENETICS 667, 
667 (2015). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Lowe et. al, supra note 111, at 17. 
 153 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 154 NDNAD STATISTICS, supra note 120. 
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Africa; Europe, the Middle East, and South/Central Asia; East Asia; 
Oceania; and American.155 Not only do these not correspond to the 
subpopulations used in the NDNAD, but population geneticists 
continue to debate whether human populations can even be separated 
into subpopulations.156 Ethnic inferencing relies on this subpopulation 
research but because population geneticists have not yet reached a 
consensus, ethnic inferencing’s scientific foundation is questionable. 
Therefore, ethnic inferencing cannot be properly validated. 
2. Ethnic Inferencing is Not Sufficiently Reliable to be Used in 
Investigations 
Even if ethnic inferencing were properly validated, the 
technique is also insufficiently reliable to be used during investigations. 
Ethnic inferencing has two factors that threaten its reliability. First, 
ethnicity is a nebulous term, as many refer to it as a spectrum and one 
person could belong to multiple ethnicities.157 Second, ethnic 
inferencing requires investigators to assume what an individual’s 
ethnicity is.158 Both of these factors undermine ethnic inferencing’s 
reliability. 
Ethnicity and race have had a complicated history from 
slavery,159 to eugenics,160 to the modern day notion that race is a social 
                                               
 155 Noah A. Rosenburg et. al, Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 
SCIENCE 2381, 2382 (2002). 
 156 Reanne Frank, Back with a Vengeance: the Reemergence of a Biological 
Conceptualization of Race in Research on Race/Ethnic Disparities in Health, POPULATION 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA ANNUAL MEETING (2006) (arguing that the 
subcategories “discovered” are highly dependent on research design). 
 157 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 158 Id. at 80. 
 159 Slavery in Britain mostly occurred in British colonies, not on the British 
mainland. Slavery was abolished in 1833 by the Slavery Abolition Act. David 
Olosoga, The History of British Slave Ownership has been Buried: Now its Scale can be Revealed, 
THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 11, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/12/british-history-slavery-buried-
scale-revealed. 
 160 ’Eugenics’ was coined by a British man, Francis Galton, to describe the 
idea of social Darwinism that some races were inherently inferior to others. This idea 
was later adopted by Hitler and the Nazi party. Victoria Brignell, The Eugenics 
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construct.161 Today there is a clear understanding that race and 
ethnicity occur on a spectrum.162 In other words, although some Asian 
and European individuals, for example, may be genetically distinct, at 
the edges of populations the genetic difference may be minimal or 
non-existent.163 This complicates ethnic inferencing because an 
individual could have one ethnic appearance but a different genetic 
appearance.164 This undermines the reliability of ethnic inferencing 
because if an ethnic inference is made in this scenario, it may be 
incorrect. Likewise, investigators who incorrectly label an individual to 
an ethnic category undermine the technique’s reliability. 
Ethnic inferencing also requires investigators to make their 
own subjective determinations about an individual’s race.165 These 
subjective determinations may often be incorrect.166 This could lead to 
both “tunnel vision” and to decreased reliability of results.167 As 
discussed in Section II(D), ethnic inferencing requires investigators to 
input their subjective determination of a suspect’s ethnicity with the 
suspect’s DNA profile. This data is in turn used to generate the 
population statistics required for ethnic inferencing.168 When these 
subjective determinations are wrong, they increase the uncertainty in 
the ethnic inference. 
The lack of consensus among population geneticists 
undermines ethnic inferencing’s validity. The nature of ethnicity itself 
and the impossibility of correctly determining a suspect’s ethnicity with 
one hundred percent certainty both undermine ethnic inferencing’s 
                                               
Movement Britain Wants to Forget, NEWSTATESMAN (Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/society/2010/12/british-eugenics-disabled. 
 161 Natalie Quan, Note, Black and White or Red All Over? The Impropriety of 
Using Crime Scene DNA to Construct Racial Profiles of Suspects, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 
1423 (2011). 
 162 Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Race Ethnicity and Genomics: Social 
Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity, 12 GENOME RES. 844, 844 (2002) 
(tracing the dominant ideas about race and ethnicity over time). 
 163 Id. at 845. 
 164 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Cho & Sankar, supra note 128, at 5. 
 167 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 168 Lowe et. al, supra note 111. 
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reliability. Both the lack of validity and the lack of reliability suggest 
that ethnic inferencing should not be used as an investigative tool. 
B. Ethnic Inferencing Has a Prejudicial Effect on Minorities 
Although ethnic inferencing can be used to narrow down the 
suspect pool to any ethnicity, it burdens minorities more than the rest 
of the population for two reasons.169 First, ethnic inferencing promotes 
DNA dragnetting which disproportionately affects minorities.170 
Second, because minorities are overrepresented in DNA databases, 
ethnic inferencing can perpetuate incorrect and stereotypical ideas 
about the criminal disposition of minorities.171 
A DNA dragnet is a technique often used when investigators 
do not have any leads in a particular case.172 A DNA dragnet, like the 
one that eventually identified Colin Pitchfork,173 generally involves 
gathering DNA samples from a large population in the hopes that the 
suspect will submit a sample.174 Because DNA dragnets do not rely on 
an individualized suspicion, they are voluntary.175 However, DNA 
dragnets are criticized because they infringe on civil liberties, as 
individuals are often faced with the choice of submitting a DNA 
sample or becoming a suspect.176 As Barry Scheck, the director of the 
Innocence Project, has noted, “[i]t’s inherently coercive when a 
policemen comes to your door and says, ‘Give us sample of your blood 
and if you don’t give it to us, you’re a suspect.’”177 Thus, individuals 
may not actually have a choice whether to submit a DNA sample. 
DNA dragnets have a more serious implication when ethnic 
inferencing is employed. When an ethnic inference is made, 
                                               
 169 See S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1180. 
 170 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Symposium Article—Part I: The 
Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. ETHICS 
153, 156 (2006). 
 171 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 172 See Cho & Sankar, supra note 128, at 6 (describing DNA dragnets). 
 173 See infra section (II)(B). 
 174 Cho & Sankar, supra note 128, at 6. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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investigators focus their attention on individuals of a specific 
ethnicity.178 For example, if an ethnic inference tells an investigator that 
the likely ethnicity of the suspect is Middle Eastern, investigators will 
only focus on Middle Eastern individuals. If a DNA dragnet is 
employed, the investigator would only take samples from Middle 
Eastern individuals. DNA dragnets in combination with ethnic 
inferencing lead to ethnic minorities becoming overrepresented in the 
NDNAD.179 
The latest statistics on the NDNAD reflect this 
overrepresentation.180 The proportion of individuals in the NDNAD 
by ethnic appearance is as follows: White Northern European: 75.55%; 
Unknown: 7.97%; Black: 7.56%; Asian: 5.26%; White South 
European: 2.22%; Middle Eastern: 0.81%; and Chinese, Japanese, or 
South East Asian: 0.62%.181 Absent DNA profiles from arrestees, if 
DNA dragnets and ethnic inferencing applied to all ethnicities equally, 
it would be expected that the amount of individuals in the NDNAD 
of each ethnicity would be proportional to the population at large. 
However, this is not the case in the United Kingdom. According to a 
2011 census, the population of the United Kingdom is 87.2% white, 
3% black/African/Caribbean/black British, 2.3% Asian/Asian 
British: Indian, 1.9 percent Asian/Asian British: Pakistani, 2 percent 
mixed, and 3.7% other.182 Although these categories used by the census 
and the categories used by the NDNAD are not identical, it is clear 
that White individuals are underrepresented in the NDNAD and most 
other ethnicities are overrepresented in the NDNAD. White 
individuals constitute 87.2% of the British population but only 75.55% 
of samples on the NDNAD, an over ten percent difference.183 
Meanwhile, black individuals constitute just three percent of the British 
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 179 S and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1180. 
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population but account for 7.56% of the samples on the NDNAD. 
From these examples alone, it is clear that white individuals are 
underrepresented in the NDNAD and black individuals are 
overrepresented. 
The disparity between different ethnicities in the NDNAD 
occurs because an ethnic inference which indicates that the suspect is 
White or European is not particularly helpful to investigators. 
Although a “white” ethnic inference may help to eliminate some 
suspects, the inference does not help to narrow down the suspect pool 
by any meaningful amount. Because the majority of the British 
population is White or European184, an ethnic inference that indicates 
the suspect is white does not help to eliminate any appreciable number 
of suspects.185 Thus, ethnic inferencing is generally only helpful when 
the suspect is a member of a minority. 
The overrepresentation of minorities in the NDNAD has two 
implications. First, it shows that ethnic inferencing disproportionately 
effects minorities186, as discussed above. The second implication, and 
perhaps the more concerning of the two, is that overrepresentation in 
the NDNAD can lead to incorrect generalizations about race.187 
Because minorities are overrepresented in the NDNAD, it can lead the 
public to infer that minorities have a greater propensity towards crime 
than the rest of the population.188 Without understanding DNA 
dragnets or the retention of innocent individuals’ DNA profiles, this 
generalization perpetuates incorrect and prejudicial ideas about race. 
In addition to the legal implications of ethnic inferencing, investigators 
should consider the ethical implications of contributing to the 
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 185 See e.g., Amade M’Charek, Silent Witness, Articulate Collective: DNA Evidence 
and the Inference of Visible Traits, 22 BIOETHICS 519, 525 (describing a case in the 
Netherlands in which ethnic inferencing was used. The community suspected that a 
murder was perpetrated by a group of asylum seekers. Ethnic inferencing ruled out 
the asylum seekers as suspects, but investigators were unable to make any more use 
of the ethnic inference as the inferred ethnicity of the suspect was North-Western 
European, so the majority of the population could not be ruled out). 
 186 NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 19, at 81. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
2020 Ethnic Inferencing 8:2 
829 
overrepresentation of minorities in the NDNAD and the prejudicial 
stereotypes it encourages. 
C. Ethnic Inferencing Violates the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights contains a 
number of articles which the member states must abide by.189 The 
signatories to the ECHR are the members of the Council of Europe, a 
separate body from the European Union.190 The United Kingdom at 
the conclusion of Brexit, will have left the European Union, but not 
the Council of Europe. Additionally, the United Kingdom has 
incorporated the ECHR into domestic law through the Human Rights 
Act. Although the fate of the United Kingdom post-Brexit it still 
unclear,191 the United Kingdom will still have to abide by the articles 
of the ECHR. Thus, ethnic inferencing, which violates both Article 8 
and Article 14 of the ECHR, must be discontinued as an investigatory 
technique. 
1. Ethnic Inferencing Violates Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Article 8 of the ECHR protects individuals’ right to privacy.192 
Article 8 states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except as in accordance with the 
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law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.193 
The EC has already held that the permanent retention of 
innocent individuals’ DNA profiles violates Article 8 of the 
Convention.194 The decision in S and Marper clarifies that member 
states do not have unlimited discretion in how they use their DNA 
databases. Although the EC has yet to address ethnic inferencing, the 
EC should examine it in light of S and Marper v. United Kingdom, and 
find that it violates Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Ethnic inferencing invokes the same interference with private 
life invoked by S and Marper.195 Both the permanent retention policy 
struck down by the EC in S and Marper and ethnic inferencing rely on 
the retention of DNA profiles.196 Ethnic inferencing relies on these 
same retention policies with the added concern that ethnic data is 
linked to an individual’s DNA profile in the NDNAD.197 S and Marper 
clearly held that the retention of DNA samples was an interference 
with the right to private life.198 Because ethnic inferencing interferes 
with the right to private life, the only other question is whether ethnic 
inferencing is justified. 
Article 8 of the ECHR allows for an interference with the right 
to a private life if the interference is necessary to fulfill one of the 
enumerated goals.199 The state must overcome a high bar to 
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demonstrate that the challenged interference is necessary.200 For 
example, in S and Marper, the government provided evidence that the 
permanent retention of innocent individuals’ DNA profiles had 
resulted in a number of prosecutions of individuals whose DNA would 
not have been in the NDNAD if the permanent retention policy had 
not been in place.201 However, despite proof that the permanent 
retention policy had helped to prosecute individuals who otherwise 
might have gotten away, the EC ruled that the interference was not 
necessary to promote the public safety interest.202 Therefore, the state 
must show more than a minimal investigatory use to prove that the 
invasion into private life is necessary. 
Ethnic inferencing only has a minimal investigatory 
function.203 Unlike DNA profiling analysis, ethnic inferencing cannot 
be used at a criminal trial.204 Unlike a DNA profile which can point 
investigators to a specific suspect if his or her DNA profile matches 
the sample, ethnic inferencing only narrows down the suspect pool.205 
Finally, ethnic inferences are rarely made.206 However, each ethnic 
inference has a disproportionate impact, it allows for a DNA dragnet 
to be used to obtain samples from hundreds or even thousands of 
people.207 Based on ethnic inferencing’s minimal investigative use, 
compounded with its increased interference with the right to private 
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life, this technique is unnecessary in the interests of public safety and 
therefore violates Article 8 of the ECHR. 
2. Ethnic Inferencing Violates Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Even if ethnic inferencing does not violate Article 8, ethnic 
inferencing does violate Article 14 of the ECHR. Article 14 of the 
ECHR protects individuals from discrimination by member states of 
the ECHR.208 Article 14 states: “The enjoyments of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”209 Article 14 
is sometimes referred to as a parasitic right.210 In other words, the 
violation must be attached to some other violation of the ECHR in 
order to come in to force.211 However, another Article of the EC does 
not itself have to be violated in order for Article 14 to be violated.212 
For example, the EC addressed Article 14 in the case 
Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom.213 The petitioners in 
this case were three female lawful permanent residents of the United 
Kingdom.214 The petitioners had requested permission under the 
United Kingdom’s immigration laws for their spouses to join them in 
the United Kingdom, however, all three requests were denied.215 The 
petitioners appealed the ruling on Article 8 grounds (interference with 
the right to private life) and Article 14 grounds.216 Although the court 
ruled that the denial did not violate Article 8, it did rule that the denial 
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came within the realm of the right to private life.217 The court went on 
to find that the denial violated Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
8.218 As the court stated, 
“Article 14 . . . complements the other substantive 
portions of the Convention and Protocols.. . . . [T]he 
application of Article 14 . . . does not necessarily 
presuppose a breach of those provisions[.] . . . The 
facts at issue [must] fall within the ambit of one of 
more of the [other provisions]”.219 
Thus, although the petitioners’ Article 8 claim failed, the EC 
found that the United Kingdom had violated Article 8 in conjunction 
with Article 14.220 
Likewise, ethnic inferencing violates Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 8. A difference in treatment is discriminatory if “there is 
not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realized.”221 Ethnic inferencing’s 
goal is to apprehend criminals.222 However, the disproportionate 
impact ethnic inferencing has on minorities is not proportional to its 
minimal investigative value. Because ethnic inferencing discriminates 
against minorities and invokes an Article 8 privacy concern, the 
technique violates Article 14 the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After the Golden State Killer was arrested and the world 
became acquainted with familial searching, many had mixed emotions. 
Familial searching was useful because it helped to capture a notorious 
serial killer. However it also invoked privacy concerns that many—
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even those who have submitted their DNA to a genealogy website223—
had not considered. Familial searching and the Golden State Killer case 
may be one of the most infamous of the DNA analysis techniques that 
have been developed recently, but it is far from the only one. The 
public should make themselves aware of and scrutinize every DNA 
analysis technique. 
Ethnic inferencing involves many of the same privacy 
concerns that familial searching does. It has the potential to connect 
innocent individuals to a crime. Ethnic inferencing is potentially even 
more concerning. Where familial searching connects innocent 
individuals to crimes based on family relationships; ethnic inferencing 
connects innocent individuals to crime scenes simply based on their 
ethnicity. 
Ethnic inferencing is extremely problematic. The technique 
relies on questionable validity because of the ongoing debate within 
the population genetics field. Ethnic inferencing is only minimally 
useful in investigations and can often be unreliable because it requires 
a number of subjective determinations to be made by investigators. 
Ethnic inferencing also interferes with the right to private life in 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR as an interference that is not 
necessary in a democratic society. Ethnic inferencing also perpetuates 
prejudicial ideas about minorities and discriminates based on race in 
violation of Article 14 of the ECHR. In light these concerns, ethnic 
inferencing should be discontinued as a practice in the United 
Kingdom. 
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